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Abstract 
This paper sets out to analyse the regional policy of the European Union by assessing whether the 
actual distribution of funds to the regions undermines the principle of territorial concentration. The 
empirical analysis shows that, due to either political equilibriums or inaccurate assumptions about 
the most cost-effective allocation of the funds, the sources of structural disadvantage are more 
spatially concentrated than the funds devoted to compensating this disadvantage and reveals a weak 
association between socio-economic disadvantage and EU funding. Corrections in allocation 
mechanisms are recommended in order to increase fund concentration and more adequately earmark 
resources to disadvantaged regions. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The debate over the EU budget 2007-2013 made clear the need for an in-depth understanding of the 
structure and the impact of EU development funds. A more effective targeting of the scarce regional 
resources in response to the real needs of EU countries and regions would deliver greater results – 
and justify this use of public money – especially at a time when the eastward enlargement of the EU 
is, on the one hand, reducing the available resources in comparison to the target areas and, on the 
other, increasing economic disparities across member states. The urgency for a highly cost/effective 
EU regional policy has stimulated a significant amount of scientific work aiming at assessing the 
structure, implementation and impact of the policy and identifying potential room for further 
improvement. As suggested by Batchtler and Wren (2006): “During the past 15 years, the Cohesion 
Policy of the European Union has become one of the most intensively evaluated policies in Europe” 
(p.143). However, notwithstanding this activity, major methodological barriers have prevented the 
literature from reaching a consensus on the magnitude of the impact of structural funds on territorial 
cohesion (Bradley, 2006). In particular what makes it conceptually hard for “macro-models” to 
extract the pure impact of structural expenditure from the “background of all the other domestic and 
external shocks that affect the economy at the same time” (Bradley p.189), is the lack of  an 
appropriate counterfactual scenario (”what would have happened without an active regional policy? 
Could even more inequalities have possibly arisen?”). Such counterfactual analysis while crucial for 
any policy assessment (Colin and Wren, 1999; Wren, 2005), is hard to construct and heavily 
dependent upon the assumptions that underlie it. In addition there are also major difficulties 
associated with the quality of the data available for any evaluation exercise (Baslé, 2006; Martin 
and Tyler 2006). 
On the basis of these considerations this paper has approached the assessment of the EU structural 
policy from a different standpoint i.e. by focusing its attention upon the à priori structure of the 
policy rather than upon its impact. In so doing, the paper focuses its attention on one of the “core 
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principles” of the structural funds since the 1989 reform: concentration and, in particular, territorial 
concentration. In 2004 the publication of the Third Cohesion Report (CEC 2004) presented 
concentration, together with programming and partnership as the “core principles” FOR improving 
the effectiveness of structural expenditure. However, the same report concluded that, as concerns 
concentration, “in the sense of focusing funds on the areas most in need,  (…) evaluations suggest 
that resources are still sometimes spread too widely and thinly” (CEC 2004 p.xxii). In this 
perspective this paper  sets out to test the existence of an à priori bias in the geographical allocation 
of the funds that undermines the principle of concentration and prevents intervention from fully 
targeting the real sources of competitive disadvantage of the EU regions. In line with this objective 
the paper analyses the regional allocation of the EU funds in order to assess whether (and to what 
extent) it is consistent with the factors that have been shown to hamper the local economy’s 
capability to grow and develop at an adequate pace. In order to reach this objective the paper aims 
at bringing together two separate strands of literature: the literature on the analysis of the regional 
policies of the EU and that on the role of underling socio-economic conditions in explaining 
differential regional growth performance. While the results of some of the former are biased by the 
counterfactual problem discussed above, the latter has rarely been fully exploited for the purpose of 
drawing direct economic policy implications.  
This paper aims at filling the gap between these two strands of literature by directly comparing the 
socio-economic preconditions for successful regional development with the correlated allocation of 
structural funds. On the basis of the evidence provided by the literature and in order to maximise its 
chance of success, EU regional funds should be allocated according to the geography of such 
sources of competitive disadvantage. In other words, given that a set of socio-economic conditions 
have been shown to be factors hampering the economic success of many EU regions, the EU funds 
should be allocated in order to “compensate” the structural disadvantage of the assisted areas.  
 4  
This paper aims at assessing precisely this potential bias in the geographical allocation of the 
structural funds (Objective 1 and 2) in both the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 programming periods1 in 
order to shed some light on the coherence of the policy hitherto pursued and draw some 
implications for the future evolution of European regional policy.  
More specifically, in this paper:  
a) the spatial concentration of structural expenditure is analysed. A low degree of spatial 
concentration of regional funds would contradict the principle of territorial concentration 
introduced in the 1989 reform of the funds as an important prerequisite for their 
effectiveness; 
b) the spatial concentration of EU funds is contrasted with an indicator of the socio-economic 
disadvantage of the EU regions. This analysis will allow us to investigate the coherence of 
the EU regional policies in terms of the structural disadvantage of EU regions thus 
uncovering a potential inconsistency between policy objectives (favouring disadvantaged 
areas) and the beneficiaries of the funds; 
c)  an empirical model to assess to what extent regional funds are, in fact, associated (in a 
statistically significant way) with the above-mentioned sources of competitive disadvantage 
is developed; 
d) a simple convergence analysis is pursued in order to show that increasing the concentration 
of the funds and investing in the most disadvantaged areas could be the best strategy to 
promote cohesion. 
A weak territorial concentration and a reduced correlation between the geographical allocation of 
the funds and the structural disadvantage would suggest that even before their operational 
translation into actual development policies, the impact of the funds may have been reduced by  the 
inability to correctly select their targets i.e. the regions where socio-economic disadvantage is more 
severe. 
                                                 
1
 As will be discussed when presenting the dataset, major data limitations prevented us from including the 1989-93 
programming period. 
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This paper is organized into five further sections. In the first section the approach adopted in the 
paper will be placed in the context of the academic literature on EU regional policy thus showing 
how the analysis of the spatial allocation of the funds can highlight inconsistencies in the structure 
of the policy that existing analyses have overlooked. In addition, the sources of regional socio-
economic disadvantage identified by the literature on regional growth in the EU are briefly 
reviewed thus allowing us to single out some simple indicators to be used as a benchmark for the 
assessment of the correlation between structural funds and needs of the regions. In the second 
section the methodology followed to assess the spatial structure of both funds and socio-economic 
disadvantage is presented and an empirical model to measure the correlation between regional funds 
and socio-economic disadvantage outlined. In the third section the empirical results are discussed. 
The fourth section discusses some implications for the design of regional policies. The final section 
sets out some conclusions. 
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2.0 Regional policy and structural disadvantage 
2.1 The EU regional policy, its objectives and the inconsistencies potentially reducing its 
impact 
The European Community Treaty states that “(…) the Community shall aim at reducing the 
disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the 
least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas” (Article 158). The same objective is 
included in the EU draft Constitution (article III-220).  
The financial resources devoted to the pursuit of this objective have grown substantially over the 
years: from ECU 68 billion (at 1997 prices) allocated by the Brussels European Council in 1988 for 
the 1989-1993 period to the Euro 195 billion (at 1999 prices) of the 2000-2006 programming 
period2 (European Commission website). Altogether the expenditure for regional policy is 
particularly significant when assessed as a percentage of the GDP of many lagging regions: 2.7% 
(of national GDP) in Greece, 2.8% in Portugal, 1% in Spain, 0.7% in Ireland in the year 2000 (E.C. 
2000).  
However, even if the amount of resources devoted to the objective of promoting an “overall 
harmonious development” of the Union has not been negligible, the empirical literature has been 
unable to reach a consensus on the influence that the expenditure of such resources has had on  the 
actual level of territorial cohesion of the EU. Although a comprehensive review of the terms of this 
debate lies outside the scope of this paper, we shall, nevertheless, refer to some of these empirical 
analyses - irrespective of their final conclusions on actual policy impact – in order to highlight the 
factors that may have prevented the policy from maximising its impact on territorial cohesion.  
While Leonardi (2006) finds that the policy has “favoured the convergence of less developed 
regions toward the EU mean in terms of annual economic growth, employment level and 
unemployment between 1988 and 1999 and thereafter” (p.164) with a general trend towards 
convergence both at the national and at the regional level, Martin and Tyler (2006) – where 
                                                 
2
  In addition the Cohesion Fund distributes resources for about €2.5 billion per year from 2000 to 2006, for a 
total of €18 billion (at 1999 prices). 
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assessing the possible effect of the policy on cumulative regional employment by explicitly 
addressing the counterfactual problem -  conclude that “at the very worst, the Structural Funds may 
have helped to prevent a further widening of employment gap between the Objective 1 regions and 
the prosperous regions” (p.209). Conversely, other authors have emphasized both the lack of 
upward mobility of Objective 1 regions (which remained almost the same between 1989 and 2005 
with a few exceptions3) and the absence of convergence across EU regions in contrast with the 
convergence observed across the member states that dominated the past twenty-five years of 
European growth  (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Magrini, 1999; Puga, 2002): a process of “club 
convergence” would seem to be in place across the EU regions, leading to the formation of clusters 
of regions with persistently different income levels (Canova, 2004; Quah, 1996 and 1997). 
In the light of this debate, some empirical studies have attempted to explicitly address the different 
factors that may influence the capacity of regional policy to deliver its intended benefits, by 
providing an important tool for the improvement of actual policies. Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 
(2002)’s analysis highlights the potential distortion generated by structural funds on the location 
decisions of R&D intensive firms. Structural funds provide an incentive for firms to locate in 
assisted regions with a poor endowment of human capital,  producing an inefficient outcome for 
both firms (that cannot benefit from an adequate labour pool in the local area) and workers (who do 
not benefit from an increase in labour demand due to the skill mismatch). Thus, EU aid should be 
focused “on helping regions change their endowments and specialize according to the resulting 
comparative advantage” (p.352). Albeit produced using different theoretical frameworks4, this 
evidence is not far removed from the results of Cappelen et al. (2003), who conclude that the impact 
of structural funds is positive but “crucially dependent on the receptiveness of the receiving 
environment” (p.640). In line with these results, Bondonio and Greenbaum (2006) find that 
                                                 
3
  Abruzzo (Italy) lost its Objective 1 status in 1997. A few regions and areas lost their Objective 1 status with 
the 2000-2006 programming period but  received transitional support under Objective 1 of the Structural Funds for the 
period from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2005 or 2006 (Commission Decision 1999/502/EC). 
 
4
  While Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) focus on the determinants of firms’ location, Cappelen et al. 
(2003) develop a “new growth theory” model with a Schumpeterian perspective. 
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Objective 2 programmes have proven more effective where pre-policy disadvantage is less 
accentuated. These findings emphasize the role of relatively more favourable contextual 
conditions/endowments, which in turn, lead to a paradoxical situation whereby EU funds fail to 
work precisely where they are most needed.  
Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) by more directly assessing the impact of structural funds on 
regional growth performance, find that such an impact crucially depends on the distribution of 
resources across development axes. The closer fund allocation addresses contextual conditions, i.e. 
by being channelled towards human capital enhancement, the more its effects tend to be positive 
and significant while this is not the case when other objectives are pursued (i.e. infrastructure 
development).  
The evidence briefly reviewed above suggests the potential efficiency-loss caused by any 
“operational” mismatch between policy targets and the real needs of the lagging regions when 
financial resources are divided among the different axes and then translated into concrete actions. In 
this paper we aim to contribute to this debate by, instead, analysing the potential “spatial” 
mismatches between areas where the factors of disadvantage are concentrated and areas where the 
resources  are being channelled by a policy design which may à priori reduce the funds’ capability 
of delivering the expected benefits and tackling the “structural deficiencies in key factors of 
competitiveness”  (CEC 2004). As a consequence, the paper will follow the existing literature and 
contribute to the ongoing debate by assessing a specific potential weakness of the EU regional 
policy and suggesting how potential improvements can be made. This will be done from a 
perspective that tends to  be overlooked by the existing literature i.e. by focusing on the à priori 
allocation of the funds rather than on their ex-post impact. The empirical analysis of the 
convergence process of the EU regions will bring to light the importance of an allocation of funds 
that really reflects the actual socio-economic disadvantage (or “structural deficiencies” in 
Commission’s words) of the EU regions. 
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2.2 Territorial concentration and correlation with structural disadvantage: a necessary pre-
condition for policy impact. 
Structural funds are designed to foster economic and social cohesion in the EU by promoting the 
economic development of lagging regions (Objective 1) and assisting economic and social 
restructuring in areas experiencing structural difficulties (Objective 2). However, “since 1994 the 
connection between poor nations and structural spending has been greatly diluted (as) large parts of 
Finland and Sweden were designated as eligible, and even some Austrian regions, together with all 
of the former East Germany” (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006, p.242). This process may be the result 
of the tendency of spatially targeted policy to spread and lose focus over time (Greenbaum and 
Bondonio, 2004), thus suggesting that “while making territorial discriminations, EU cohesion 
policy (…) has essentially been a policy for economic and social development for much of the last 
30 years” (Bachtler and Polverari, 2007, p. 107).  It was the pressure for setting aside budget 
resources aimed at financing the eastward enlargement of the EU that forced a reduction in both the 
areas eligible for assistance and community initiatives in the Agenda 2000 reform of the structural 
funds  (Armstrong, 2001). Such a reduction was explicitly inspired by the principle of territorial and 
financial concentration: i.e. the relatively scarce resources for the EU regional policies should be 
channelled more specifically to where they are most needed in order to maximise their 
effectiveness. Over time the need for an increase in the geographical concentration of the structural 
funds expenditure has become progressively more apparent and “concentration” has been re-
asserted, within the “framework for cohesion policy 2007-2013”, among the key leading principles 
for the new programming period5.  
But why is geographical concentration so important for the impact of the policy? Intuitively a 
smaller number of beneficiaries may allow a larger amount of resources to flow in selected regions. 
                                                 
5
 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Brussels, 05.07.2005 COM(2005) 0299, “Cohesion Policy in 
Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013”, p.8. 
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However, not only is the level of expenditure in the objective region relevant in itself  but also that 
in its neighbouring regions (Dall’Erba, 2005). By this we mean that the spatial externalities 
produced by the implementation of regional development programmes of whatever nature need to 
be taken into account because an insufficient spatial “concentration” of the funds may decrease their 
impact by reducing the amount of such externalities “flowing” within the assisted areas. In this 
respect Bradley (2006) highlights that without such external effects  there is no evidence of long 
term benefits from the structural funds: Structural Funds (SFs) externalities boost the impact of the 
SFs programmes while “benefits from structural funds in isolation  are modest thus drawing 
attention to the fact that the real, long-term benefits of the SFs are more likely to  be associated with 
the way in which each of the lagging economies responds to opportunities arising in the rest of the 
EU” (p.197). 
In addition, the importance of the “capacity to respond” to external opportunities suggest that the 
spatial structure of the funds needs to be assessed in combination with the underlying socio-
economic conditions of the assisted regions. In order to maximise their impact the funds should be 
directed where persistent factors of disadvantage prevent the local economy from fully expressing 
its potential (Mairate 2006) i.e. the geography of the funds should reflect as much as possible the 
geography of the structural disadvantage of the EU regions.  
 
2.3 Where are the funds most needed? Evidence from the literature. 
A specific set of factors has been shown by the literature to act as structural sources of competitive 
disadvantage for the local economy. Lagging regions in the EU, notwithstanding their, in many 
respects, profound differences, share a common set of analogous social conditions whose role is 
emphasized by the economic restructuring accelerated by the process of European integration  
(Rodríguez-Pose, 1998a). While some economic factors (such as capital and technology) seem more 
able to adjust to the challenges of the EU integration (by virtue of their relatively higher mobility), 
social structures tend to be much less flexible. Consequently, it is possible to identify a specific set 
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of “structural” conditions that are persistently associated with poor economic performance and 
which are very slow to adjust themselves endogenously. These factors concern, to different extents, 
features of the labour force, the employment of local resources, demographic structure and change, 
and the accumulation and quality of human capital (Rodríguez-Pose, 1998b). 
However, the distinctive role of underling socio-economic conditions must be assessed in a 
theoretical framework where, in line with the Lisbon Agenda6, innovation is explicitly considered 
the driving force for growth. The objective of an innovation-based growth model for the Union has 
guided the implementation of the EU structural policies and the assessment of their results since the 
year 2000. With the drawing up of the Community Strategic Guidelines “Cohesion Policy in 
Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013” - which set out a 
framework for new programmes for the current programming period - “knowledge, innovation and 
the optimisation of human capital” are explicitly assumed as means whereby Europe can “renew the 
basis of its competitiveness, increase its growth potential and its productivity and strengthen social 
cohesion” (Presidency conclusions, European Council, March 2005 and incipit of the above-
mentioned Community Strategic Guidelines). In addition the role played by the cohesion policy in 
pursuing the Lisbon agenda has increased in 2007-2013 programming period Financial Perspective, 
which concentrated expenditure on the Lisbon objectives (Presidency conclusions, European 
Council, December 2005). 
In this political framework a variety of contributions have reformulated Romer’s endogenous 
growth model in order to explicitly recognise growth as a multivariate process where human capital 
accumulation but also sectoral specialisation of the labour force, migration, university education 
                                                 
6
 The European Council, which met in Lisbon in 2000, set the goal of making the EU “the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion” (Presidency Conclusions, par. 5). The regional dimension of social cohesion is, together 
with full employment, explicitly mentioned as the ultimate expected outcome of the strategy. Crucially, the Lisbon 
strategy relies on the capability of knowledge to be translated into growth in order to deliver economic development. 
Furthermore, by focusing policy efforts on the creation and diffusion of knowledge, growth is not only supposed to be 
increased but also qualitatively improved in terms of sustainability, quality of employment, and (social and regional) 
cohesion.   
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and geographical location emerge as relevant factors for economic performance (Fagerberg et al. 
1997; Cheshire and Magrini, 2000).  
More generally, the role of socio-economic conditions in the translation of innovation into regional 
growth has been treated in a systematic way by the introduction of the concept of the “social filter” 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 1999): the interaction of a complex set of economic, social, political and 
institutional features that makes some regions “prone” and others “averse” to innovation.  
In line with the evidence produced by this strand of literature, the multifaceted socio-economic 
conditions of the EU regions are introduced in our analysis by means of a set of variables describing 
the local socio-economic realm. Innovation averse socio-economic conditions, by persistently 
hampering the growth capabilities of some areas, trace out the geography of the structural 
disadvantage of the EU territories (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi 2008; and Crescenzi, Rodríguez-
Pose and Storper 2007 for an EU-US comparative analysis). As a consequence, it seems reasonable 
that in terms of both equity and efficiency, the geographical allocation of regional funds should 
follow the spatial structure of these factors. Thus, regarding equity, such a distribution of resources 
across regions should compensate the residents of “disadvantaged” regions for unfavourable 
starting conditions (Bachtler and Polverari, 2007). And in terms of efficiency, giving adequate 
attention to the structural sources of competitive disadvantage of assisted regions seems the most 
effective way of promoting the full employment of local resources.  
Altogether spatial concentration and correlation with the factors of disadvantage are necessary – 
though not sufficient - conditions for “ensuring that the impact of Structural Funds is not dissipated 
through resources being spread too thinly (…) geographically (…), while at the same time making 
sure that all regions with serious structural problems receive assistance” (CEC 2004, p. 164). 
 
3.0 Where do the funds actually go? Assessing their territorial concentration and the 
coherence of their geographical allocation.  
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In the previous section we discussed the importance of the territorial concentration and 
geographical distribution of the funds in relation to the structural disadvantage of the EU regions for 
the success of any EU policy aimed at promoting regional convergence. This section sets out to 
outline an empirical strategy to investigate the spatial structure of the allocation of the EU structural 
funds and their relationship with the sources of structural disadvantage discussed in the previous 
section. The descriptive spatial analysis of both phenomena will be followed by an empirical 
analytic model that singles out the importance (statistical significance) of the socio-economic 
factors in driving the distribution of the EU structural funds (Objective 1 and 2)  under both the 
1994-1999 and 2000-2006 programming periods, in order to shed some light on the coherence of 
the policy hitherto pursued. 
In this section the methodology followed in the analysis is briefly presented together with the 
corresponding dataset. The empirical results are discussed in the fourth section.  
 
3.1 A measure for socio-economic conditions: the “Socio-Economic Factors” variable 
The variables that the existing literature has shown to be more relevant for describing the socio-
economic disadvantage of a regional space – as discussed above - are those related to three main 
domains: educational achievements (Lundvall, 1992; Malecki, 1997), the productive employment of 
human resources and its demographic structure (Fagerberg et al. 1997). From the first domain, 
tertiary educational attainment (of both the population and the labour force) and participation in 
lifelong learning programmes are assumed as a measure for the accumulation of skills at the local 
level. In the second domain, the percentage of labour force employed in agriculture and the long-
term component of unemployment are included in the analysis in order to capture the amount of 
human resources excluded from productive employment. Long term unemployment represents the 
incidence of people whose possibilities of being productively involved in the labour market  are 
persistently hampered by inadequate skills (Gordon, 2001). Agricultural employment is frequently 
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synonymous with “hidden unemployment”7 and a backward structure of the local economy 
(Federico, 2006). For the third domain, the percentage of population aged between 15 and 24 is 
assumed as a proxy for the flow of new resources entering the labour force, thus “renewing” the 
existing stock of knowledge and skills (European Commission 2006) (see Appendix A for a 
detailed description of the variables). These factors are autonomously introduced into the analysis 
in order to assess their individual weight. However, in order to assess their “global” relationship 
with the allocation of structural funds, while minimising the problems of multicollinearity8, the 
socio-economic variables are combined by means of Principal Component (PC) Analysis (Jollifee, 
1986). Consequently, the set of variables discussed above is “reduced” to an individual variable that 
is able to preserve as much as possible of the initial information (variability) (see Appendix B for 
the results of the PC analysis and technicalities). Such procedure allows to handle an individual 
variable that “summarizes” the multifaceted nature of the socio-economic conditions of each region. 
In the remaining part of the paper, this variable will be referred to as the “Socio-Economic Factors” 
variable. 
 
3.2 The empirical model for the allocation of funds across regions  
The empirical model aims at estimating a “hidden” decision function of the European policy maker 
in the allocation of the structural funds across regions. Such a “decision function” would reflect the 
“rationale” of the policy, uncovering the coherence of the policy design with the identified sources 
of structural disadvantage. The final decision on the allocation of the funds is the result of a 
complex set of interactions between the Commission, the Council and the member states (also 
members of the Council) which may dilute the policy objectives originally set out in the strategic 
policy guidelines. Once the specific objectives and fields of intervention of the regional policy are 
translated into the necessary regulatory framework (Council Regulation) and general budget 
                                                 
7
 Where  long term unemployment tends to be persistently high and labour mobility low, less skilled workers tend to 
move to the countryside to be employed,  with a very low marginal productivity, in (frequently family owned) small 
farms thus allowing an easier access to primary goods. 
8
  Which prevents their simultaneous introduction into the regression equation. 
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allocations (in their turn the result of complex multi-level bargaining process, see e.g. Bachtler and 
Wishlade, 2005 for a reconstruction of the 2007-2013 negotiation round) decided, the breakdown 
by member state of the commitment appropriation are calculated, for Objective 1, on the basis of a 
formula that takes into account the overall development of the country (national prosperity), the gap 
between the GDP per capita of the country’s eligible regions and the Community average (regional 
prosperity) and the level of unemployment. This formula yields the  “per capita aid” which is then 
applied to the population of the Member State’s eligible regions (those with a GDP per capita, 
measured in purchasing power parities, below 75% of average Community GDP) thus providing the 
commitment appropriations for each member state. Once the national amounts are defined, the 
magnitude of each region’s financial commitment is the result of the interaction between the 
Commission and the national and regional plans and priorities.  
These complex institutional procedures, leading to the actual allocation of the funds to the regions 
often result in a final outcome not necessarily coherent with the principle of concentration evoked 
in the general framework of the policy. As a consequence, the assessment of the territorial 
concentration of the funds should not be limited to the designation of eligible areas but must also 
take into account the actual financial allocations to the regions. 
Coherently, our empirical model, by regressing the per capita regional commitments of the 
structural funds on the sources of socio-economic disadvantage identified above, will allow us to 
“measure” the role of these factors in the actual allocation of the funds. The reduced weight of these 
factors in both the eligibility and the allocation decisions, which contradicts the principle of 
territorial concentration, can reflect: 
a) the predominant role of “power” factors in the design of the policy where the present 
allocation of the funds might be the result of the political equilibrium reached in the 
bargaining process between the Commission, the Council, the national governments, the 
local governments and the various pressure groups (Lehman, 1994 suggests a “historical” 
tendency of spatially targeted policy to be “diluted” over time. See also Bachtler and 
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Wishdale, 2005 and Bachtler and Mendez, 2007 for a comprehensive analysis of these 
political dynamics in the negotiations for the various programming periods); 
b) the willingness of the European policy-maker to privilege, in the distribution of the funds, 
the relatively more advantaged regions on the basis of the (questionable, as we will discuss 
later) assumption that this category of regions would show a better potential for growth and 
development. 
Two models will be estimated in the empirical analysis. A first model analyses the allocation of 
Objective 1 and Objective 2 funds separately, while a second model considers the overall regional 
distribution of the structural funds. Our methodology will, up to a certain extent, follow Greenbaum 
and Bondonio (2004) who assess the territorial focus of spatially targeted policies in the US 
(Federal Empowerment Zones) and in the EU (Objective 2 programmes). Greenbaum and Bondonio 
develop an empirical model that estimates the probability that an area may become eligible for 
policy support as a function of that area’s pre-designation characteristics. However, in accordance 
with our previous consideration, we have developed a more comprehensive model that assesses the 
territorial focus of the policy by simultaneously taking into account the eligibility criteria and the 
amount of funds allocated to this areas. Consequently, the first part of the empirical analysis is 
based on a two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Green, 2003). The first stage 
determines “eligibility” as an Objective 1 (Objective 2) area. Such a decision is based on specific 
criteria that should improve the territorial concentration of the funds and, à priori, select the most 
disadvantaged areas according to each objective’s “mission”. However, such a decision can, in fact, 
be biased for the reasons discussed above. Consequently, the first step of the Heckman selection 
model aims at assessing, through a probit model, how the factors of socio-economic disadvantage in 
fact influence the probability of a region of being assisted (or not). The model is estimated 
separately for Obj1 regions and for Obj2 regions in both the programming periods considered. 
The estimated model is the following: 
iii Zw εγ += '                                                                               (1) 
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where  
wi=1 if the region i is an assisted region and wi=0 if the region is not assisted; 
and  
)()1Pr( ' ii Zw γΦ==  and )(1)0Pr( ' ii Zw γΦ−== ; 
where: Φ (x) is the normal cumulative distribution function; iZ is a set of socio-economic 
explanatory variables: the Socio-Economic Factors variable computed by means of Principal 
Components Analysis, some of its individual components and a set of national dummy variables; 
γ is a vector of parameters; and iε is the error term. 
In a second step the level of support is regressed on its potential determinants while taking into 
account the selection bias introduced in the sample by the à priori selection of eligible areas.  
Consequently, the following second-step H-C OLS model is estimated: 
iii Xy εα +=
'
                                                                          (2) 
Where iy (>0) is the level of per capita commitment in region i, α is a parameter vector, X are the 
explanatory variables and iε is the error term. The set of explanatory variables includes: the socio-
economic conditions, a set of national dummy variables (to estimate a potential “national” bias in 
the distribution of the funds) and the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR).  The IMR is calculated from the 
first stage probit model and is used in the second step as an instrument for the latent variable that 
determines whether an area is eligible or not. In other words the IMR links the participation of the 
regions to the distributions of the funds (1st step) with the amount of funds received (2nd step). 
The second part of the empirical analysis will focus on how socioeconomic factors drive the 
observed level of total regional expenditure per capita (under both Objective 1 and Objective 2): the 
“composition effect” generated by interaction of Objective 1 and Objective 2 expenditure might 
even further “dilute” the policy targets. 
Consequently, we will estimate an OLS model regressing the commitment level per capita under 
both Objective 1 and 2 on the socioeconomic variables and a set of national dummy variables: 
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iii Xy εα +=
'
                                                                              (3) 
Where iy (that this time includes all the regions included in the sample) is the level of per capita 
commitments in region i, α is a parameter vector, X are the explanatory variables (socio-economic 
factors + national dummies) and iε is the error term. 
 
3.3 The dataset 
Since the objective of the analysis is to assess the coherence of the spatial allocation of structural 
funds with the sources of competitive disadvantage of the EU regions it is necessary to identify the 
most appropriate spatial scale of analysis in order to consider homogeneous and (to the extent 
possible) functionally “self contained” units in terms of both their capacity to receive funds (and 
exert political pressure for this purpose) and their socio-economic structure. Where funds are 
allocated to areas without any corresponding governance level and a reduced functional self-
consistency, a leakage effect seems to prevail (due to the functional links of the area with the rest of 
the region) thus forcing us to assume that the entire region is a beneficiary of the funds. 
Consequently, given the constraint of data availability, but also for reasons of homogeneity and 
coherence in terms of the relevant institutional level discussed above, the analysis is based upon 
NUTS1 regions for Germany, Belgium and the UK and NUTS2 for all other countries9 (Spain, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, Austria, Portugal, Finland). This choice for the unit of 
analysis, while coherent with the objective of focusing the attention on “self-contained” functional 
regions of institutional relevance, may seem in contrast with the areas actually eligible for Objective 
2 funds: designated areas are groups of contiguous cities or towns. The adoption of such a fine 
geographical level has proven problematic for the empirical analysis of both the structure and the 
                                                 
9  Countries without a relevant regional structure (Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg) were necessarily excluded 
from the analysis. In addition,  regional data on  many variables are not available for Sweden. As far as specific regions 
are concerned, no data are available for the French Départments d’Outre-Mer (Fr9). Uusimaa  (Fi16) and Etela-Suomi 
(Fi17) were excluded from the analysis due to the lack of data on socio-economic variables.  Etela-Suomi (Fi17) and 
Trentino-Alto Adige  (IT31) were excluded from the analysis as they have no correspondent in the NUTS2003 
classification, thus preventing us from matching data available only in the new NUTS classification. Islands (PT2 
Açores, PT3 Madeira, FR9 Departments d’Outre-Mer, ES7 Canarias) and Ceuta y Melilla (ES 63) were excluded from 
the analysis as time-distance information, necessary for the computation of spatial weights (Appendix C), is not 
available.  
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impact of Objective 2 policies. The development of socio-economic indicators for actual Objective 
2 designated areas would imply aggregating data from the appropriate NUTS5 level however - as 
highlighted in almost all similar existing research on structural funds - comprehensive data for the 
EU regions are only provided by Eurostat at the NUTS2 level (and, in some cases, not even at this 
level). Consequently, all the “macro” analyses of structural policy have been forced to rely on a 
larger (inevitably sub-optimal and partially arbitrary) scale of analysis (see Martin and Tyler 2006, 
p.204; Baslé 2006 p.226; Armstrong and Wells 2006 p. 270; CEC 2004 p.168). While, in this 
respect, our empirical analysis shares the limitation of all other empirical exercises on this same 
topic, this constraint does not fundamentally bias the results of the analysis. Viewing a map of 
Objective 2 areas it is immediately apparent that they cover a large part of the non-Objective 1 areas 
thus making the average per capita commitment at the NUTS 2 level, a reasonably good proxy for 
the actual commitment at the provincial or sub-provincial level. This idea is explicitly tested and 
empirically confirmed by Greenbaum and Bondonio (2004) who analyse the correlation of 
Objective 2 funds with their intended target in both NUTS3 level regions for the entire EU and in 
NUTS5 regions for the case of Italy (for which they find appropriate data from national sources). 
The results of the analysis are similar in the two cases but “at a finer geographical level it became 
much more difficult to distinguish treated from untreated areas” (p.331) i.e. finding a correlation 
between economic distress and Objective 2 eligibility. This evidence suggests that, when moving 
the focus of the analysis from larger areas to small geographic units (without any functional 
economic meaning) the level of correlation between funds and economic distress tends to decrease. 
As a consequence, our analysis, by considering large institutionally relevant units of observation 
may, at worst, overestimate the actual level of correlation. This potential upward bias of our results 
further reinforces the claim for increasing concentration that we will put forth in the subsequent 
analysis. 
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The data on the regional distribution of commitments10 for structural fund expenditure stems from 
the European Commission website (Inforegio) and takes into account all structural funds11. In 
addition, the analysis relies upon an Annex of the EC report “The impact of structural policies on 
economic and social cohesion 1989-99”. For the sake of comparability between programming 
periods, Objective 1 and Objective 6 data, on the one hand, and Objective 2 and Objective 5b, on 
the other, are combined together for the 1994-1999 commitments.   
The Operational Programmes (OP) and Single Programming Documents (SPD) for both 
programming periods have been associated to the appropriate NUTS region, providing the total 
committed expenditure in each region. The total commitment has been divided by the average 
population of the region during the respective programming period in order to obtain per capita 
expenditure. Unfortunately the analysis could not cover the first cycle of regional policy (1989-
1993) since data on commitments provided by the European Commission (1997) do not include 
regional information for Greece, preventing any à priori comparability with the analysis pursued 
for the subsequent programming periods. Furthermore data on the socio-economic indicators for the 
1988-89 reference year are only available for a few regions. 
The data source for the socio-economic conditions of the EU regions is Eurostat’s REGIO databank 
(see Appendix A for a detailed description of the variables). The year 1994 is assumed as  reference 
year for the socio-economic conditions variables in order to minimize any potential endogeneity 
between  higher (lower) funds and better (worse) socio-economic conditions. 
 
4.0 Empirical results 
4.1 Spatial concentration: structural funds vs. socio-economic disadvantage 
                                                 
10
  Only data for commitments  rather than expenditure are available. However the use of commitments data is 
coherent with our theoretical framework, as we aim at analysing the à priori structure of the policy rather than 
estimating the impact of actual expenditure. 
11
  The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Guidance section of 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF-Guidance) and the Financial Instrument for fisheries 
guidance (FIGS). 
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The analysis of the spatial distribution of the variables is pursued by calculating the value of 
Moran’s I (see appendix C for technicalities). Moran’s I is a measure of the global spatial 
autocorrelation of the variables (Cliff and Ord, 1981). When Moran’s I is significantly different 
from zero the variable of interest exhibits a systematic spatial pattern. A positive value of this index 
means that areas with a high (low) level of per capita structural expenditure tend to cluster close to 
other areas with high (low) expenditure. The same line of reasoning is valid for the factors of socio-
economic disadvantage, where a positive value of the index means a pattern of clustering of regions 
with similar high/low values. The magnitude of the indicator provides a measure of the strength of 
the spatial pattern i.e. the extent of the clustering process of similarly high/low values. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Table 1 shows the value of Moran’s I for regional expenditure under Objective 1 and 2 and for total 
structural fund expenditure. The table shows that a clear spatial pattern is identifiable in the 
distribution of both funds and indicators of socio-economic disadvantage. Moran’s I is positive and 
significant in all cases, thus showing a positive spatial autocorrelation: regions with a high (low) 
level of expenditure (socio-economic disadvantage) tend to be clustered together. This result is in 
line with the principle of concentration of funds repeatedly claimed by the European Commission. 
However, if the results are examined in greater detail by considering the magnitude of the index, it 
is possible to note, as was expected, that Objective 1 tends to be more concentrated than Objective 2 
expenditure which seems to respond more weakly to this principle of concentration (in both the 
programming periods). It must be noted, though, that the overall territorial concentration of 
expenditure has increased after the Agenda 2000 reform of the structural funds: Moran’s I for 
Objective 1, Objective 2 and total expenditure has increased from one programming period to the 
other thus confirming the capacity of this reform to impact upon the final outcome of the bargaining 
process leading to the regional allocations of the funds. However, as we discussed in the previous 
sections, the territorial concentration of the funds should be compared with that of the socio-
economic sources of competitive disadvantage. This benchmark is provided, in the last line of  table 
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1, by the Moran’s I for the Socio-Economic Factors variable which is calculated through the 
Principal Component Analysis from the whole set of socio-economic variables previously 
discussed.  The comparison between the magnitude of Moran’s I of the “Socio-Economic Factors” 
and that of structural expenditure shows that socio-economic factors are more spatially concentrated 
than structural funding. Thus, even if the territorial concentration of expenditure increased with 
successive reforms of the structural funds it seems to be still insufficient when compared to the 
spatial pattern of the sources of structural disadvantage. This provides the first evidence in support 
of our hypothesis of there being a “spatial mismatch” between the factor of structural disadvantage 
and regional funds, encouraging further analysis of the geographical allocation of the funds, and it 
also confirms the possibility of achieving greater spatial concentration while allowing for the 
regional allocation of the funds to be driven by the bargaining process between the Commission and 
the national and regional governments. However, as argued in the previous section, the existence of 
a clear spatial pattern in the allocation of the funds per se might not be sufficient for the policy to 
deliver the expected benefits; closer adherence to the regional sources of structural disadvantage 
might also be necessary.  
 
4.2 The drivers of the regional allocation of structural funds  
Following the specification presented in par. 3.2 we estimate a two-stage Heckman selection model 
for the allocation of Objective 1 (Tab.2) and Objective 2 (Tab.3) funds, highlighting the weight of 
the observed socio-economic factors in the “implicit” decision function for the regional allocation 
of structural funds. The tables show the estimations results for the programming periods 1994-1999 
(on the left hand side of the table) and 2000-2006 (right hand side). For each programming period 
equations (1) and (2) are estimated by regressing the funds on the “Socio-Economic Factors” 
variable (column a) and on some of its individual components12 (column b).  
                                                 
12
  As noted previously multicollinearity prevents the simultaneous inclusion of all these variables into the 
regression. 
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When looking at the results for the Probit Selection Model (lower part of the tables), which analyses 
the probability for a region of being eligible for Objective 1 (or Objective 2 in Tab.3) support, it 
should be borne in mind that the magnitude of the parameters estimated by the probit technique 
does not have a direct meaning in terms of the extent of the corresponding effect. However, the 
parameters are informative as far as their signs and significance are concerned and provide 
information on how the factors of socio-economic disadvantage in fact influence the probability of a 
region of being assisted (or not) 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
As regards Objective 1 funds (Tab.2), the Socio-Economic Factors variable shows a negative sign 
and a high significance level in both the programming periods thus implying that favourable socio 
economic conditions (i.e. a high value of the social factors variable) reduce, as expected, the 
probability of being considered an eligible area (column a). This seems to confirm that the actual 
eligibility criterion, based on per capita income, is a good proxy for weak socio-economic 
conditions. However, if the factors influencing the probability of becoming an eligible region are 
considered in greater detail (column b), we shall notice that the “traditional” sources of 
disadvantage are more “rewarded” by this system: the “percentage of labour force concentrated in 
agriculture” and “long term unemployment” significantly increase the chances of being under the 
75% of the EU average per capita income (thus becoming an Objective 1 region). On the contrary, 
other factors are less accurately proxied by the actual income-based eligibility criteria. The 
“percentage of the young population” is not significant while “tertiary education attainments” 
shows a positive sign meaning that in many cases the regions selected for assistance are not those 
with a relatively poorer human capital endowment.  
In the second step of the model, the amount of funds received (by eligible areas) is analysed 
(Equation 2), assessing whether (and to what extent) the amount of funds allocated to each eligible 
regions is correlated with the magnitude of the regional socio-economic disadvantage. The 
empirical results show that, while significant for the acquisition of the status of assisted region, the 
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socio-economic factors are not significant for determining the level of the funds received by 
assisted regions (column a). In other words, the distribution of funds across the eligible areas does 
not seem to reflect their actual differentiated socio-economic status i.e. more disadvantaged regions 
do not receive more funds than regions with relatively more favourable conditions. When 
considering specific socio-economic factors (column b) we notice that only the education level 
variable shows a high level of significance in 2000-2006: a relatively higher percentage of tertiary 
educational achievements seems to reduce the amount of funds received in favour of less well 
endowed regions. The national dummies highlight a certain degree of national bias in the allocation 
of the funds in favour of some member states (in particular Germany and Spain in 1994-1999 and 
Spain in 2000-2006), but this bias seems to disappear when the socio-economic conditions are fully 
accounted for by the Social Factors variable.  Such national bias can be considered the result of the 
systematically higher disadvantage of the regions of these countries (which the distribution of the 
funds is able to reflect), rather than the result of a more favourable treatment in favour of these 
countries. 
Such evidence supports the idea that even if the present eligibility criterion is able to pursue a 
(rough) discrimination in favour of the relatively more disadvantaged regions, the amount of funds 
transferred to assisted regions is not correlated to the extent of their actual socio-economic 
disadvantage. This lack of correlation undermines the principle of concentration which, is regarded 
by the European Commission as a key pre-condition for maximising the impact of structural funds 
expenditure (CEC 2004). 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Table 3 presents, in the same way as in the previous table, the results for the estimation of the two-
step Heckman selection model for Objective 2 funds.  The results for the probit selection model 
(column a) show, as expected, that Objective 2 regions have relatively more favourable socio-
economic conditions: the socio-economic factors variable is positive and significant. In addition, as 
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expected, Objective 2 regions are mainly  industrial regions13 (a high % agriculture labour force 
tends to reduce the probability of being “selected”), suggesting that Objective 2 actions are still very 
much focused on industrial areas even after the merger with the former rural-area-oriented 
Objective 5b (column b). Furthermore the population of selected Objective 2 regions is relatively 
older in comparison with other areas (a high percentage of young people reduces the probability of 
eligibility) in accordance with the aim of providing support to less dynamic areas where ageing is a 
significant source of disadvantage. However, the present eligibility criteria seem unable to fully 
discriminate the areas with a relative scarcity of skilled labour, as shown by the non-significance of 
the education variable in 2000-2006 and, in particular, those where the long-term component of 
unemployment is higher (negative and significant signs in both programming periods). When we 
move on to the analysis of the determinants of the amount of funds allocated to the regions 
(Equation 2), we find no sign of any correlation with the underling socio-economic conditions of 
the assisted areas (except for the education variable in 2000-2006). This evidence supports the idea 
of an overall weakening of the coherence between the structural funds and their ideal targets 
operated by means of the expenditure under the Objective 2. On the contrary, where aiming at 
favouring the socio-economic “restructuring” of declining regions, Objective 2 funds should follow 
the geography of socio-economic disadvantage. If the existing eligibility criteria – being explicitly 
based upon a set of structural indicators –have been able to target the funds coherently with at least 
some of the sources of socio-economic disadvantage, the subsequent distribution of the funds to the 
eligible regions seems to be markedly in contrast with the principle of concentration. The 
bargaining process for the allocation of the funds seems again able to significantly dilute the policy 
objectives (in line with the conclusions of Greenbaum and Bondonio 2004 for Objective 2). 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
In table 4 the overall allocation of structural funds under both Objective 1 and 2 is assessed, thus 
focusing upon their interactions and “composition effect” as parts of a single EU policy action.   
                                                 
13
 For 1994-1999  Objective 5b funds, targeted towards rural areas, are combined with the Objective 2 funds, targeted 
towards “urban and industrial” areas, for sake of comparability with the 2000-2006 programming period when the two 
areas are put together under Objective 2. 
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The results for the regression of the level of total (Obj.1 + Obj.2) structural funds per capita on the 
socio-economic conditions (Equation 3) are presented. The overall amount of funds allocated to the 
EU regions partially reflects their underlying socio-economic conditions (column a), even if the 
percentage of the overall variability explained by such factors is relatively small. This suggests that, 
when the distribution of Objective 1 and Objective 2 funds is assessed jointly and in a systematic 
way, the focus of the financial resources on structural factors of disadvantage tends to be rather low. 
However, it is worth noticing that the R-squared shows an increase from 1994-1999 to 2000-2006 
thus confirming that Agenda 2000 succeeded in increasing the level of territorial concentration and 
the overall correlation between the amount of funds and the magnitude of regional structural 
disadvantage. In this dynamic perspective, the EU regional policy seems potentially able to escape 
the “spatially targeted policy trap”, as warned by Lehman (1994) and highlighted by Greenbaum 
and Bondonio (2004) for the case of Objective 2 funds i.e. the tendency towards losing focus and 
diluting the territorial concentration of the funds over time. While the territorial concentration of the 
funds still seems sub-optimal, this trend towards increasing concentration over time in response to 
the emphasis placed by the European Commission on this objective suggest that the claim for an 
increase in territorial concentration is a realistic achievement.  When considering the specific socio-
economic factors that influence the distribution of the funds (column b), we notice that the 
agricultural labour force, as a “traditional” source of disadvantage, still seems to be the main driver 
of the funds at the expense, for example, of the level of human capital accumulation which, instead, 
has been shown to be particularly relevant in the context of a knowledge based economy. The 
national dummies, while minimising the problem of spatial autocorrelation, highlight a certain 
degree of national bias in the distribution of the funds in favour of the “cohesion countries.” A bias 
for which, in the 1994-1999 period, Germany also received particular benefit.   
Overall this analysis of the “hidden” determinants of the allocation of the structural funds confirms 
a weak association between the funds and the structural disadvantage of the EU territories. While 
the reinforcement of the principle of territorial concentration has not only increased the spatial 
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concentration of the funds but also improved their adherence to these factors of disadvantage, the 
analysis highlights that there is still much more room for further improvement in both respects. In 
addition, while the general socio-economic structure of each regions should be taken into account 
by the allocation mechanism of the funds, some specific factors deserve greater attention in the 
context of the knowledge based economy. This is especially true for human capital accumulation, 
whose deficiency has been shown insignificant to determine the amount of resources received by 
the regions but which has become a key source of competitive advantage for both the development 
of Objective 1 and the restructuring of Objective 2 regions. 
 
4.3 Socio-economic disadvantage and regional convergence 
In the previous section it was argued that a potential explanation for the lack of correlation observed 
between the factors of socio-economic disadvantage and the amount of funds received by the EU 
regions  might be explained in terms of the desire to privilege, in the distribution of funds, the 
relatively better endowed regions. This choice could find its theoretical justification in the emphasis 
on the receptiveness of the local economy as a prerequisite for successful regional policies. This 
standpoint, developed in the framework of the neo-Schumpeterian literature, regards relatively more 
favourable socio-economic conditions as necessary for the investment to deliver (Cappellen et. 
2003) and, consequently, the policymaker may find it more cost-effective to channel funds towards 
relatively better-off regions (those supposed to show the better development potential) in order to 
maximise their impact. However, the empirical evidence on the economic performance of the 
Objective 1 regions over the 1994-2003 period (i.e. from the first year of implementation of the 
1994-1999  programming to the most recent year for which regional GDP data are currently 
available) explicitly contradicts this assumption. When sigma-convergence is considered, by 
assessing the change in the total variance of the regional income per capita from 1994 to 2003, the 
lack of convergence for both the whole Europe and the subset of Objective 1 regions is apparent 
(Table 5).  
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[Insert Table 5 around here] 
However, the comparison between the T1 statistic14 (i.e. the initial year variance/final year variance 
ratios) for all the EU regions and that for the Objective 1 only shows that dispersion of regional per 
capita income increased more significantly in the EU as a whole than in the Objective 1 regions, 
thus supporting the idea of there being a variety of “clubs” developing at different rates.  The lack 
of a trend towards generalised (unconditional) convergence in the EU regions is confirmed by the 
simple beta-convergence analysis à la Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1992) presented in table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
The regression shows a negative coefficient for the log of the initial level of the GDP per capita 
(Eq.1). However the evidence of unconditional convergence becomes much weaker and almost 
insignificant when a set of national dummies is introduced into the analysis (Eq.2) thus both 
controlling for the “national growth” effect and minimising the extent of spatial autocorrelation. 
The picture changes when the sub-sample of Objective 1 regions is considered separately: the 
degree of convergence is not only stronger (Eq.3) but it also remains significant after the 
introduction of the national dummy variables (Eq.4). This confirms the idea of a process of “club 
convergence” (Quah, 1996) among the Objective 1 regions which explicitly contradicts the idea of a 
better growth potential of the relatively more well-off regions (in line with Rodríguez-Pose and 
Fratesi 2004). On the contrary, the initially more disadvantaged Objective 1 regions seem to grow 
faster than other potentially better endowed areas in line with the evidence provided by Martin and 
Tyler (2006) on the capacity of structural funds to at least prevent a further widening of existing 
gaps . The catching up of the former with the latter uncovers the growth potential of the poorest 
Objective 1 regions, a potential that would have been more effectively emphasized by a higher 
degree of concentration of the structural funds thus allowing the maximisation of those externalities 
that Bradley (2006) has shown to be necessary if any long term impact is to be achieved. In 
                                                 
14
 The T1 statistics is : T1 = 2
2
1
ˆ
ˆ
Tσ
σ
. Where 21σˆ  is the variance of regional income per capita at time 1; 
2
ˆTσ  is the 
variance at time t. This statistic is distributed as a F with (n-1; n-1)  degrees of freedom (Lichtenberg,  1994).  
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addition, as shown above, such reduced concentration has been coupled with a lack of correlation 
between the funds and the factors of structural disadvantage. The growth potential of more 
disadvantaged regions is confirmed when disadvantage is assessed in terms of socio-economic 
factors and becomes very apparent when considering the Objective 1 subset alone (compare Fig.1 
and Fig.2 where regional growth rates are scattered against socio-economic factors for all the EU15 
regions and for the Objective 1 regions only).  
[Insert Fig.1 and 2 around here] 
However, when convergence is assessed on the basis of socio-economic factors (Tab.6; equations 5-
8), the evidence suggests that, when national effects are controlled, many socio-economically 
disadvantaged regions are not able to catch-up with the EU as whole (Eq.7) and with the Objective 
1 “club” (Eq.8). In other words, in line with the literature on the socio-economic preconditions for 
regional growth, we find that such factors have hampered the capacity of Objective 1 regions to 
converge.  Consequently, while there is no evidence to encourage the targeting of resources towards 
relatively better endowed regions (the contrary is in fact true), there is plenty of evidence to support 
the necessity for the EU regional funds to tackle structural disadvantage. In consequence, the 
geographical correlation between such disadvantage and the allocation of the funds is confirmed to 
be a necessary condition for their effectiveness.  
 
5.0  Some policy implications: how socio-economic factors could complement GDP per capita 
for a more effective allocation of the funds. 
As extensively discussed in the previous sections the present allocation mechanism relies heavily on 
GDP per capita (at Purchasing Power Standard, PPS) to drive the allocation of  regional funds: GDP 
per capita is not only the key determinant of the breakdown by member state of the commitment 
appropriation15 but it is also used to grant eligibility to Objective 1 regions. However, where the 
                                                 
15
 It should be born in mind that, as discussed in details in section 3.2 the allocation of the funds at the country level are 
calculated on the basis of a funding formula, while the actual commitments at the regional level are based on the 
Operational Programmes which are the result of a bargaing process between the Commission, the national and the 
regional governments. 
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actual correlation between GDP per capita (at PPS) and the structural funds per capita allocated to 
the regions is assessed - as in table 7 – it becomes immediately apparent that the final outcome of 
the process of allocation of the resources to the regions is only a weak reflection of the underlying 
GDP conditions. Table 7 shows that the correlation between GDP per capita (at PPS) at the 
beginning of the programming period and total funds per capita (Obj1 + Obj2), though statistically 
significant, is far from perfect:  the correlation coefficient is -0.65 for 1994-1999 and -0.59 for the 
2000-2006 programming period. Furthermore this correlation sharply decreases when the sub-
sample of Objective 1 regions is considered separately, the correlation between Objective 1 funds 
per capita and GDP per capita (at PPS) falls to -0.46 for 1994-1999 and -0.28 for 2000-2006 
programming period. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
On the basis of this evidence it might be tempting to suggest improving territorial concentration and  
resource targeting by reinforcing this relationship between low GDP per capita (at PPS) and the 
amount of funds available, thus relying even more on this simple and readily available indicator. 
However, while our convergence analysis highlighted - in line with a significant body of literature - 
that socio-economic disadvantage should be the target of EU regional policy in order to promote 
convergence, the regression analysis of the regional allocation of the funds revealed that the present 
GDP-based allocation mechanism is ineffective in channelling funds towards structural socio-
economic disadvantage, suggesting that a low level of GDP per capita per se would be a misleading 
driver for regional funds (lower level of GDP does not necessarily mean lack of convergence 
capabilities). In addition, table 7 also shows that the correlation between GDP per capita (PPS) and 
our measure of Socio-Economic disadvantage is rather low (slightly above 0.4): GDP per capita 
would also be a poor proxy for the underlying socio-economic disadvantage. This is confirmed 
when looking at Fig.3, where Objective 1 regions’ GDP per capita is scattered against the Socio-
Economic factors variables. 
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[Insert Fig.3 around here] 
 The scatter clearly shows that despite similar per capita GDP (at PPS) values there are extremely 
differentiated regional socio-economic conditions. Figure 3 is also helpful for the detection of the 
imbalances allowed by the current allocation mechanism, which becomes immediately apparent 
when regions are differentiated on the basis of their structural disadvantage. The graph combines 
information on GDP per capita (at PPS) (x-axis), Socio-Economic environment (y-axis) and the 
corresponding 2000-2006 Objective 1 funds per capita (the area of the symbols in the graph is 
proportional to the funds per capita allocated to each region) in Objective 1 regions. It provides us 
with visual confirmation of the lack of a systematic relationship between the support’s magnitude 
and both GDP per capita and endogenous socio-economic conditions thus allowing us to identify 
the inconsistencies produced by the present allocation mechanism. Some regions show a similar 
level of GDP per capita and benefit from a comparable level of support, however, when their socio-
economic environment is more carefully assessed (i.e. by means of our Socio-Economic factors 
indicator), marked differences become apparent. This is – for example - the case of the regions 
Campania (Italy) and Thüringen (Thuringia, Germany). In figure 3 both regions are close to each 
other on the x-axis (i.e. they have a similar GDP per capita in PPS) and are represented on the graph 
by a symbol of a similar size (i.e. in the 2000-2006 programming period benefited from a similar 
amount of resources per capita). However, their different y-coordinates (i.e. the value of the Socio-
Economic factors variable) uncover intrinsic structural differences in terms of their capacity to 
converge: while Campania shows critical socio-economic conditions, Thüringen shows a relatively 
more favorable situation thus probably needing comparatively fewer resources to tackle its 
economic backwardness. Symmetrically, figure 3 allows the detection of regions benefiting from a 
significantly different level of support per capita while showing similarly unfavorable socio-
economic conditions, as in the case, for example, of Alentejo (Spain) and Kriti (Crete, Greece). 
Even though these regions show a similar value in terms of their Socio-Economic factors variable 
(y-axis) a significantly higher amount of resources was committed to Alentejo .   
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The observed allocation of the EU funds is, as extensively discussed in this paper, the result of a 
complex bargaining process between the Commission, the member states and the regions in which  
power equilibriums and the differentiated capability of each region to “attract” (and lobby for) 
additional resources play a significant role. While this mechanism is to be preserved, as it provides 
an incentive for the capability of the regions to design and plan the policy measures to be actually 
implemented, the present analysis calls for a corrective mechanism able to increase territorial 
concentration and channel more  resources towards relatively more socio-economically 
disadvantaged regions. Precisely the most disadvantaged (and institutionally weak) regions might 
be less able to effectively compete for the EU funds. The analysis pursued in this section has also 
highlighted the unsuitability of GDP per capita - where regional policy is seen as a tool to promote 
convergence - as a “driver” for an effective allocation of the EU regional funds. In the light of all 
this, how might the current mechanism be improved in order to achieve an allocation of the funds 
which is more in line with the regional sources of structural disadvantage? Of course, any change in 
the present allocation mechanism has to be balanced against the significant difficulties arising when 
any reform is to be negotiated among 27 Member States. However, our results suggest that – even 
while preserving the actual institutional procedure for the allocation of the funds and keeping 
largely unaffected the current allocation mechanism - significantly better targeting of the available 
resources could be achieved by combining GDP per capita with further information on the socio-
economic conditions of the target areas. As shown in the empirical analysis, ‘75% of the EU’s 
average per capita income (at PPS)’ threshold for Objective 1 eligibility has guaranteed a certain 
degree of territorial concentration of the funds. However, the eligibility criteria based upon the level 
of GDP per capita provides only a rough assessment of the highly differentiated development 
capabilities of the local economies. Consequently, once eligibility is granted on the basis of this 
rule, areas (and the associated funds) should be further differentiated on the basis of a wider set of 
socio-economic indicators by “reserving” to the most socio-economically disadvantaged regions a 
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larger share of the available “convergence” (Objective 1 in the “old” terminology) resources.  By 
differentiating the available resources into various “segments” made available to the regions 
according to their degree of structural disadvantage, the “fit” between the spatial distribution of the 
fund and the sources of socio-economic disadvantage would be improved. 
This mechanism would help reduce the endogeneity of the actual allocation mechanism, which 
inevitably tends to favour actors with a better institutional endowment but, at the same time, it 
would maintain the final level of financing related to the planning capabilities of each region.  The 
final commitments would still depend upon the plans presented by the assisted areas even though 
the pool of resources made available to the regions would vary according to their socio-economic 
conditions. 
An example of the subdivision of total available resources into different “pools” made available to 
different “categories” of areas – though still “categorised” on the basis of their GDP per capita – has 
been already introduced in the 2007-2013 General Regulation for the structural funds16.  A specific 
amount of the resources devoted to the Convergence Objective, remains earmarked to the 16 
regions whose GDP per capita is 75% below the EU 15 average but greater than 75% of the per 
capita income of the EU 25 average (i.e. the regions loosing their eligibility due to the “statistical 
effect”). This subdivision in the allocation of the convergence funds aims at reducing the resources 
devoted to these regions considered, on the basis of their GDP, more advantaged than other 
convergence regions. However, in this case, the application of the GDP criteria has granted 
“automatic” eligibility to a very heterogeneous set of regions, thus allowing funds to flow towards 
relatively more advantaged areas at the expense of others where, although the GDP per capita is 
above 75% of the EU average, the socioeconomic conditions are more critical than in some of the 
other 86 convergence regions. The same is true for the complex of the 86 convergence regions, 
which includes, without any differentiation almost the entire territory of the new member states, 
                                                 
16
 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1260/1999 
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although a vast amount of literature has highlighted an astonishing variety in the socio-economic 
situations within these countries. Conversely, the application of a wider set of socio-economic 
indicators to further differentiate among these convergence regions, would have allowed for a finer 
à priori targeting of the resources. 
The mechanism designed for the 2007-2013 programming period suggests that an agreement among 
the member states on “gradual” changes of the allocation mechanism is actually feasible. Our 
results suggest that a significant improvement in the present allocation mechanism would be 
achieved by  integrating GDP with additional indicators able to take into account the differences 
that the literature and the convergence analysis have shown to be crucial for regional convergence 
capability, and which remain outside the scope of GDP per capita (PPS). 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
This paper sets out to investigate the coherence of the allocation of the structural fund to the regions 
with the principle of territorial concentration. While some contributions have suggested that the 
nature of the policies implemented within the EU regional policy framework might have curbed the 
impact of the structural expenditure at the level of territorial cohesion, this paper suggests that 
potential inconsistencies in the policy as regards the objective of territorial cohesion might have 
arisen at a more upstream phase i.e. in the allocation mechanism of the funds to the regions. This 
mechanism might not only have led to an insufficient territorial concentration of the expenditure but 
also to an insufficient correlation between the funds and the set of socio-economic conditions that 
shown to be responsible for hampering the economic success of many EU regions.  
Our empirical analysis investigated both these issues in order to test this possibility which, where 
violating the principle of territorial concentration, might have prevented the structural funds from 
maximising their cost-effectiveness in terms of territorial cohesion. The results reveal that the 
regional distribution of the structural funds shows a degree of spatial concentration in compliance 
with the principle of concentration. However, while the theoretical discussion supported the idea 
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that the EU funds should be allocated in order to “compensate” for the structural disadvantage of 
the assisted areas (thus maximising their effectiveness), empirical results suggest that the 
disadvantage is more spatially concentrated than the associated funds: in this perspective the present 
level of concentration of the funds can be judged insufficient. Furthermore, the empirical model 
uncovered a weak association between the amounts of regional funds and the above-mentioned 
sources of competitive disadvantage, especially as far as the problem of human capital 
accumulation is concerned.  
Such an inconsistent spatial allocation of the EU funds is likely to have reduced their capability to 
impact upon the regional growth performance of assisted regions and has inevitably produced a bias 
in the allocation of national resources as well, due to the co-financing mechanism17, which forced 
the national co-financing of community funds. 
The policy analysis suggests that such a geographical allocation of funds may be either the result of 
the political dilution of the policy objectives (required by EU political equilibriums) or the effect of 
an intentional focus on relatively better endowed regions. However, the empirical evidence casts 
doubt on the rationale of such a bias in favour of the areas believed to represent a more  favourable 
condition of receptiveness for the funds.  
Consequently, every effort should be produced not only to promote the spatial concentration of the 
expenditure (which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for increased effectiveness) but also 
to increase its capability to target the factors of socio-economic disadvantage. Furthermore, while 
not undermining the robustness of the analysis discussed so far, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
the analysis is based on Structural Funds data on financial commitments rather than on actual 
spending (the latter are not available until well after the programme periods have ended). As a 
consequence, actual expenditure, given the differentiated spending capacity of the various regions, 
might further accentuate the bias in the geographical distribution of the funds given that the more 
                                                 
17
  “Each euro spent at the EU level by cohesion policy leads to further expenditure, averaging 0.9 euros, in less 
developed regions (current Objective 1) and 3 euros in regions undergoing restructuring (current Objective 2)” 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, Brussels, 05.07.2005 COM(2005) 0299, “Cohesion Policy in 
Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013”, p.7. 
 36  
socio-economically disadvantaged regions are also more likely to record a relatively worse 
performance in terms of their capacity to translate commitments into actual expenditure.  
The analysis has allowed the identification of simple improvements in the mechanism of allocation 
of the funds to the regions which, if implemented, would significantly increase territorial 
concentration and help channel more resources towards the most socio-economically disadvantaged 
areas.  In the 2007-2013 programming period the “Convergence Objective” funds have been sub-
divided into two different “pools”, in order to further differentiate the resources devoted to eligible 
areas on the basis of their GDP per capita conditions. Our analysis suggested that the introduction 
of a similar differentiation of the resources available made to the eligible regions - where based 
instead on a proxy for socio-economic structural disadvantage – would provide an allocation of the 
funds more in line with the EU’s regional policy objectives. It must be acknowledged that these 
critical issues (and geographical concentration in particular) have been explicitly considered by the 
European Commission when assessing the weaknesses of the past programming periods. However, 
when the Commission’s analysis has to be balanced against not only the claims of individual 
countries in terms of budget equilibriums but also inaccurate diagnoses on where investment is 
more worthwhile, implementing concrete corrective measures turns out to be a very gradual 
process.  
 
In conclusion, the discussion of the implication of the potential benefits of a more effective 
operationalisation of the principle of territorial concentration should not hide the crucial importance 
of the regional policy implemented. An increase in the territorial focus of the financial resources, by 
channelling more resources to the most disadvantaged regions does not per se necessarily imply an 
increase in their capability to converge (as the standard neo-classical framework would suggest). An 
increase in the Structural funds’ focus on more socio-economic disadvantaged areas needs to be 
matched by appropriate actions for the reinforcement of their local governance and translated into 
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tailor-made local policies able to tackle the sources of structural disadvantage of each individual 
region in particular with respect to the challenges posed by the  knowledge-based economy. 
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APPENDIX A -  Description of the variables 
Variable Definition 
Structural Funds  
Objective 1 / 
Objective 2 
Funds per capita 
Total committed expenditure under Objective 1/Objective 2 in each region 
divided by the average population of the region during the programming 
period (1994-1999 or 2000-2006). 
Socio-Economic Factors 
Life-Long 
Learning 
Rate of involvement in Life-long learning - % of Adults (25-64 years) 
involved in education and training 
Education 
Labour Force % of employed persons with tertiary education (levels 5-6 ISCED 1997). 
Education 
Population % of total population with tertiary education (levels 5-6 ISCED 1997). 
Agricultural 
Labour Force Agricultural employment as % of total employment 
Long Term 
Unemployment Long term unemployed as % of total unemployment. 
Young People People aged 15-24 as % of total population  
Socio-Economic 
Factors  
The index combines, by means of Principal Component Analysis, the 
variables describing the socio-economic realm of the region (listed above). 
Convergence Analysis 
Regional Growth 
Rate Annual growth rate of real regional GDP (1994-2003). 
Ln GDP 94 Natural logarithm of regional GDP per capita in 1994 
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APPENDIX B – The results for the Principal Component Analysis: the “Socio-Economic 
Factors” variable. 
The principal component analysis (PCA) is “a statistical technique that linearly transforms an 
original set of variables into a substantially smaller set of uncorrelated variables that represents 
most of the information in the original set of variables: (…) a smaller set of uncorrelated variables 
is much easier to understand and use in further analysis than a larger set of correlated variables” 
(Duntenam, 1989 p.9). Through the PCA the original variables (in the case of our analysis the 
variables shown in literature as representative of the socio-economic disadvantage of the EU 
regions) are linearly combined by means of a set of “weights” (a1, a2, …, ak)  calculated in order to 
maximise (under the constraint of that the sum of the squared weights is equal to one) the variability 
of the resulting indicator, i.e of the principal component (our Social Factors variable). 
Consequently the i-th principal component is: 
yi=ai1x1+ ai2x2+…+aipxp 
where (ai1,ai2 aip) are the wights and   x1, x2, … ,xk are the k variables. 
It is possible to calculate as many PCs as the original variables under the constraint of non-
correlation with the previous ones. Anyway the PCs are able to account for a progressively 
decreasing amount of the total variance of the original variables. Consequently, the procedure allow 
us to concentrate our attention on the first and limited number of PCs, which are the most 
representative of the phenomenon under analysis. 
Table B-1 shows the Eigenanalysis of the Correlation Matrix. The first PC alone accounts for 
around 43% of the total variance with an Eigenvalue significantly larger than 1, the second PC 
accounts for an additional 22% of the total variability with an Eigenvalue still larger than 1. The 
first two principal components therefore explain a significant part of total variability (65%).  
Tab. B-1 - Eigenanalysis of the Correlation Matrix 
Eigenvalue 2.566 1.3311 0.8847 0.6542 0.5381 0.0259 
Proportion 0.428 0.222 0.147 0.109 0.09 0.004 
Cumulative 0.428 0.65 0.797 0.906 0.996 1 
 
The coefficients of the first PC (Table B-2) assigns a large weight to the educational achievements 
of the population (0.576) and the labour force (0.551) and to the participation in Life Long Learning 
Programmes (0.383). A negative weight is, as expected, assigned to the agricultural labour force (-
0.446) and, with a smaller coefficient, long-term unemployment (-0.139). The weight of the young 
population (0.006) is much smaller but positive. This first principal component provides us with the 
“joint measure” for each region’s socio-economic conditions. Consequently, the first principal 
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component’s scores are computed from the standardised18 value of the original variables by using 
the coefficients listed under PC1 in table B-2.  
 
Tab. B-2 - Principal Component Analysis: Principal Components's Coefficients 
 
Variables PC1 PC2 PC3 
Education Population 0.576 -0.218 -0.043 
Education Labour Force 0.551 -0.318 0.05 
Life-Long Learning 0.383 0.326 0.355 
Agricultural Labour Force -0.446 -0.227 0.068 
Long Term Unemployment -0.139 -0.505 0.802 
Young People 0.006 0.662 0.471 
  
                                                 
18
  Standardised in order to range from zero to 1 
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 APPENDIX C -  The weight matrix and the Moran’s I 
The Moran’s I is calculated on the basis of the following formula: 
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Where wij  is a sequence of normalised weights that relate observation i to all the other observations 
j in the data. Values of I larger (smaller) than the expected value E(I)=-1/(n-1) signal the presence 
of positive (negative) spatial autocorrelation. 
In our empirical application the element wij of the matrix of the normalised weights is: 
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where dij is the average trip-length (in minutes) between region i and j calculated by the IRPUD 
(2000) for the computation of their European Peripherality Indicators (E.P.I.). and made available 
by the European Commission.
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Tab.1 – Moran’s I for Objective 1 and Objective 2 Funds per capita and Socio-Economic Factors. 
 
 
Variables I E(I) sd(I) z p-value* 
 Programming Period 1994-1999 
Objective1 0.102 -0.008 0.009 11.649 0 
Objective 2 0.039 -0.008 0.009 5.061 0 
Total expenditure 0.095 -0.008 0.009 10.929 0 
 Programming Period 2000-2006 
Objective1 0.142 -0.008 0.009 15.911 0 
Objective 2 0.094 -0.008 0.009 10.781 0 
Total expenditure 0.149 -0.008 0.009 16.658 0 
 Social Factors 
Socio-Economic Factors§ 0.223 -0.008 0.009 24.329 0 
* 1-tail test 
§ This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables 
described in the text and is calculated through the Principal Component Analysis 
(Appendix B) 
 
 
 46  
 
Tab.2 - Heckman Selection model, Objective 1 Funds per capita, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables described in the text and is calculated through 
the Principal Component Analysis (Appendix B) 
 
Programming Period 1994-1999 2000-2006 
 Equation (2) 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Socio-Economic Factors§ 3622.424 (21602.14)  
1218.957 
(10951.03)  
Education Population 
 
-4988.11* 
(2562.976)  
-1913.78*** 
(456.1678) 
Agricultural Labour Force 
 
-1348.16 
(1043.342)  
-312.165 
(222.0423) 
Long Term Unemployment 
 
-574.539 
(588.8321)  
-89.498 
(110.8817) 
Young Population 
 
-3218.96 
(2456.867)  
-1067.57** 
(503.5399) 
     National Dummies 
   
de 1286.602 (3153.09) 
1044.413*** 
(362.087) 
264.6077 
(1293.069) 
291.6251 
(68.56178) 
it 10.02819 (2446.981) 
-119.275 
(215.7996) 
83.11813 
(1066.923) 
49.53745 
(46.58662) 
at 198.3732 (3683.407) 
309.7738 
(279.0372) 
142.7548 
(1579.302) 
180.4558*** 
(60.11469) 
be 498.6349 (3469.236) 
281.757 
(304.0943) 
100.9242 
(1514.511) 
95.4871 
(62.36345) 
pt -248.376 (2651.336) 
-362.557* 
(186.396) 
157.058 
(1134.62) 
123.3903*** 
(38.62917) 
nl 512.8831 (3378.771) 
369.2325 
(316.798) 
122.9396 
(1487.263) 
134.3599*** 
(66.7445) 
uk 745.6835 (3216.694) 
398.8849* 
(227.0967) 
193.8667 
(1310.763) 
129.0245*** 
(43.20416) 
es 
621.0167 
(2306.694) 
634.0799** 
(288.4948) 
252.0606 
(997.5152) 
319.0792*** 
(59.05076) 
gr 192.1769 (2456.519) 
224.2701 
(187.8398) 
-21.8073 
(1054.395) 
-1.55839 
(39.39773) 
fi 534.0902 (2926.159) 
233.248 
(286.6558) 
0.204899 
(1271.065) 
-32.9576 
(57.13414) 
Constant 3561.73 (14885.26) 
2025.47*** 
(659.4408) 
1614.26 
(11007.22) 
574.4937*** 
(137.1147) 
 Probit Selection Model (Equation 1) 
Socio-Economic Factors § -1.4158*** (0.348857) 
 
-1.0370*** 
(0.329578) 
 
Education Population 
 
5.044067* 
(2.89385)  
5.754955*** 
(2.826307) 
Agricultural Labour Force 
 
17.32992*** 
(3.535073)  
15.12283*** 
(3.218646) 
Long Term Unemployment 
 
3.435833*** 
(1.171702)  
2.609007*** 
(1.091462) 
Young Population 
 
5.912144 
(4.973609)  
6.068956 
(4.78766) 
Constant 0.265963 (0.17737) 
-4.737*** 
(1.13581) 
0.16692 
(0.172587) 
-4.25439*** 
(1.07249) 
rho 
-1 -1 -1 -0.94973 
sigma 4846.965 358.7948 2111.375 69.35247 
lambda -4846.97 (23328.48) 
-358.795 
(178.5998) 
-2111.37 
(15897.1) 
-65.866* 
(41.52635) 
*,  ** and *** denote significance  at a 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. SE in parentheses 
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Tab.3 - Heckman Selection model, Objective 2 Funds per capita, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. 
 
 
Programming Period 1994-1999 2000-2006 
 Equation (2) 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Socio-Economic Factors § 41.24806 (979.3314)  
15.24312 
(360.1518)  
Education Population 
 
-1473.4 
(2604.039)  
-219.959** 
(86.8514) 
Agricultural Labour Force 
 
-2313.08 
(5708.642) 
 
146.9052 
(213.0774) 
Long Term Unemployment 
 
-292.403 
(1097.94)  
45.70872 
(53.61375) 
Young Population  -2649.94 (4296.254)  
-95.0998 
(299.439) 
National Dummies 
   
de -14.1343 (61.11901) 
-21.8045 
(131.9588) 
-15.2183 
(25.85857) 
-16.5432*** 
(5.622292) 
it 13.79382 (83.21526) 
18.6619 
(147.3966) 
-41.2794 
(38.36847) 
-43.8702 
(7.736061) 
at -31.6908 (69.25755) 
42.80739 
(211.879) 
-20.1437 
(27.39351) 
-5.56321 
(9.046899) 
be -4.40015 (124.5079) 
-54.1565 
(220.7587) 
-6.2263 
(61.19157) 
-17.4202 
(11.50549) 
nl 74.98787 (81.38781) 
116.1177 
(221.6512) 
1.86291 
(43.41586) 
-1.35525 
(12.65517) 
uk 51.9274 (82.03706) 
46.94875 
(139.8897) 
15.96409 
(35.93839) 
6.896866 
(6.055499) 
es 
151.6018** 
(72.02708) 
123.0932 
(218.1189) 
25.25797 
(30.96621) 
20.99423** 
(10.78373) 
fi 77.1801 (113.6932) 
70.01067 
(235.5529) 
-28.5619 
(49.59434) 
-33.2919*** 
(11.58116) 
Constant -66.0253 (1528.65) 
726.9151 
(1291.69) 
-34.9188 
(511.2596) 
52.246 
(67.34726) 
 Probit Selection Model (Equation 1) 
Socio-Economic Factors § 1.121132*** (0.330526)  
1.331961*** 
(0.343357)  
Education Population 
 
-7.02116** 
(2.844077)  
-3.15919 
(2.750046) 
Agricultural Labour Force 
 
-16.0497*** 
(3.350845)  
-14.7694*** 
(3.387493) 
Long Term Unemployment 
 
-3.23574*** 
(1.131636)  
-3.56761*** 
(1.134586) 
Young Population  -10.283*** (4.739716)  
-19.6541*** 
(5.100463) 
Constant -0.22104 (0.173643) 
5.339909*** 
(1.114868) 
-0.38479*** 
(0.178404) 
6.028806*** 
(1.164758) 
rho 1 1 1 0.11154 
sigma 214.6384 363.2897 96.03772 13.05521 
lambda 214.6384 (1720.033) 
363.2897 
(714.9973) 
96.03772 
(517.8416) 
1.456141 
(28.80728) 
*,  ** and *** denote significance  at a 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. SE in 
parentheses 
 
§This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables described in the text and is calculated through 
the Principal Component Analysis (Appendix B) 
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Tab.4 - Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS model, Objective 1 and Objective 2 Funds per capita, 1994-1999 and 
2000-2006. 
 
Programming Period 1994-1999 2000-2006 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Socio-Economic Factors § -327.894*** (129.8615) 
 
-162.214*** 
(42.01456) 
 
Education Population 
 
771.8936 
(863.6608)  
-10.0642 
(231.26) 
Agricultural Labour Force 
 
1846.892*** 
(566.4197)  
703.0175*** 
(195.4019) 
Long Term Unemployment 
 
363.4748 
(264.9683)  
119.7216 
(81.18214) 
Young Population 
 
3029.142** 
(1395.854)  
1200.057*** 
(494.6487) 
National Dummies 
de 294.7922*** (111.1332) 
205.139** 
(81.83613) 
65.45534** 
(27.4801) 
35.56319* 
(20.35761) 
it 57.38723 (80.60264) 
46.11072 
(96.23988) 
-9.09578 
(27.36722) 
-22.1725 
(26.60234) 
at -37.8744 (63.17935) 
-71.8916 
(99.93928) 
-17.1091 
(25.62074) 
-40.7265 
(37.53585) 
be 153.1352 (100.7441) 
-15.7337 
(119.9024) 
54.42931* 
(26.19563) 
-2.24039 
(30.53526) 
pt -58.9707 (73.48608) 
-69.3652 
(93.02556) 
179.3968*** 
(42.1867) 
167.1739*** 
(52.87925) 
nl 91.98157 (61.66183) 
-194.286* 
(107.3449) 
20.23761 
(19.88387) 
-95.4172*** 
(36.32245) 
uk 214.5534*** (83.53881) 
60.30519 
(56.59665) 
102.6423*** 
(27.09222) 
33.96666 
(22.9845) 
es 
460.8256 
(87.2242) 
130.3368 
(130.6492) 
173.652*** 
(36.87841) 
50.1997 
(47.33312) 
gr 348.8422 (96.97734) 
61.27249 
(152.8804) 
-9.13357 
(25.41967) 
-114.086** 
(52.04321) 
fi 233.367*** (83.44499) 
82.88095 
(102.4067) 
-15.2933 
(10.75426) 
-78.7236*** 
(27.42229) 
Constant 247.3297 (60.25865) 
-596.29* 
(307.5034) 
111.9031*** 
(18.47053) 
-178.189** 
(89.55031) 
R-squared 0.37 0.46 0.46 0.56 
F-stat 8.71*** 5.47*** 17.38*** 7.62*** 
*,  ** and *** denote significance  at a 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. SE in parentheses 
 
§This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables described in the text and is calculated through 
the Principal Component Analysis (Appendix B) 
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Tab.5 – Testing sigma-convergence of regional GPD per capita, 1994-2003 
 
Test for sigma convergence    
 1994 2003 T1 p 
 All regions 
Sigma^2 33376383.85 43887527.32 0.760498 0.94 
 Objective 1 regions 
Sigma^2 9532911.765 11726050.54 0.812969 0.77 
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Tab.6 – Regression analysis for beta-convergence 
Dependent Variable: growth rate of regional GDP per capita, 1994-2003    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant 0.1207*** 0.0702*** 0.1582 0.1368** 0.017575*** 0.01273*** 0.02049*** 0.1323** 
 (0.0133) (0.0202) (0.0267) (0.054) (0.00066) (0.00144) (0.00101) (0.0645) 
LnGDP‘94 -0.0108*** -0.00406* -0.01494*** -0.0128**     
 (0.00140) (0.00208) (0.00292) (0.00565)     
    -0.000966** 6.88E-05 -0.001790*** -0.00017 Socio-Economic 
Factors 
    
(0.00041) (0.00056) (0.00052) (0.00129) 
National Dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Regions All All Obj.1 Obj.1 All All Obj.1 Obj.1 
R-Sq 31.60% 59.5% 33.9% 60.5% 4.00% 58.20% 18.4% 60.5% 
R-Sq (adj) 31.10% 55.7% 32.6% 49.9% 3.30% 54.30% 16.8% 48.7% 
F-stat 59.63*** 15.86*** 26.18*** 5.71*** 5.44** 15.04*** 11.51*** 5.11*** 
*,  ** and *** denote significance  at a 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. SE in parentheses 
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Table 7 - Correlation analysis, GDP per capita (pps), Socio-Economic Factors 
and Regional Funds 
  
GDP per 
capita 
(pps) 
1993 
GDP per 
capita 
(pps) 
1999 
Socio-
Economic 
Factors 
GDP per 
capita 
(pps) 
1993 
GDP per 
capita 
(pps) 
1999 
Socio-
Economic 
Factors 
  Correlation coefficient Spearman Rank Correlation (Rho) 
All regions       
Socio-Economic Factors 0.4221* 0.4557*  0.3786* 0.4107*  
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Total Funds per capita 94-99 -0.6460*  -0.2816* -0.7782*  -0.3229* 
 0.0000  0.0011 0.0000  0.0002 
Total Funds per capita 00-06  -0.5892* -0.3369*  -0.7700* -0.3524* 
  0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000 
Objective 1 Regions - 1994-1999      
Obj.1 Funds per capita 94-99 -0.4624*  -0.0210 -0.4204*  -0.0043 
  0.0006  0.8838 0.0021   0.9764 
Objective 1 Regions - 2000-2006      
Obj.1 Funds per capita 00-06  -0.2849* -0.2705  -0.1923 -0.2047 
  0.0386 0.0501  0.1677 0.1414 
* correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level or better    
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Fig. 1 – Regional growth rate (94-03) vs. socio-economic factors, all regions 
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Fig. 2 – Regional growth rate (94-03) vs. socio-economic factors, Objective 1 regions 
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Fig. 3  –  GDP per capita, Socio-Economic Factors and Obj.1 Funds 
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